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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
H. DELlVIAR \VHITE and NORMA
L. WHITE, his wife,
Plaintiff's and Appellants,
Case No.
11474

vs.
WEBER llASIN WATER
SERVANCY DISTRICT,

CON-

Defendant and llcspundcnt.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages to the plaintiffs' land
allegedly caused by the construction and operation of
the Willard Gravity Canal, one of the projects of the
Weber Basin Reclamation Project.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The court granted the defendant's Motion for a
Directed Verdict dismissing the action upon the ground,
1

among others, that the defendant was not the proper
party defendant and made findings of fact, conclusions
of law and entered judgment dismissing the action.

STA'l'E.MENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts in the Appellants' Brief
is inaccurate and incomplete. Much undisputed evidence
is entirely ignored and highly speculative conclusions
are stated in the brief as facts. The parties will Le
referred to as the "plaintiffs" and the "defendant or
District," and the Willard Gravity Canal will be referred to as the "Willard Canal."
The evidence is undisputed that the Willard Canal,
which the plaintiffs claim damaged their land, is one
of the project works of the Weber Basin Project, a
federal reclamation project, and was located, constructed, designed and operated by the United States.
(Tr. 135, 148, 149, 249) The United States took title
to all of the project works inclding the canal pursuant
to the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902 ( 32 Stat.
388) 43 USCA 372 et seq. as amended. Paragraph
23 of the repayment contract, Exhibit D, between the
United States and the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, dated December 23, 1952, provides that
title to the project works shall remain in the United
States until oth~rwise provided by Congress.
The government engineers in charge of the construction of the project testified that the United States
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did all of the engineering work, supervised the construction and operated the Willard Canal. (Tr. 135, 148,
H9, 249) The engineer for the defendant testified that
he had nothing whatever to do with the location, design, construction or operation of the canal, nor did
the defendant. (Tr. H8, 247) We quote from the testimoney of Mr. Rex Greenhalgh, a Bureau of Reclamation engineer :
" ... Q. ls the document you hold in your hand
with the sheet marked Defendent' s Exhibit 6 an
official document prepared by the United States
Bureau of Reclamation in connection with the
construction of the Willard Canal?
A. It is.
Q. Do you know, personally, whether the
Weber Conservancy District or any engineer or
officer connected with that District had anything to do with preparing any part of that document or assembling any of the data obtained
therein?
A. Yes, I do know. They did not have anything to do with this.
Q. Where were the designs for the canal prepared?
A. The preliminary layout and location for
the canal and designs were prepared in the Ogden office under my supervision. It is this data
which we call design data that is submitted to the
Denver office where the final designs are prepared and issued. Designs and specifications are
prepared in Denver.
Q. That is the Denver office of the Bureau of
Reclamation?
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A. The Denver office of the Bureau of Reclamation .... " (Tr. 148, 149)
The federal officer in charge of right of way acquisition testified that the United States acting through
its own employees caused the land descriptions to be
prepared for the 'Villard Canal right of way and the
contracts and deeds to be prepared and signed. (Tr.
127, 241) . On the Willard Canal, there was only one
tract which the defendant was requested to acquire and
that was the Miller tract which is not involved here.
(Tr. 241) The purchase of a small part of the Riley
Taylor tract was negotiated by a federal employee,
Charles S. Sloan, before the remaining part was deeded
to the plaintiffs. Such remaining part is the land which
the plaintiffs claim was damaged by the canal. (Tr.
125) Mr. Sloan was the only negotiator on the Willard
Canal. (Tr. 124, 125) The defendant had nothing to
do with the negotiations for right of way (except for
the ::Miller tract) (Tr. 124, 125) The Taylor deed,
Exhibit C, names the United States as Grantee.
The defendant put in evidence a great deal of
engineering and other data relating to the water table
on the plaintiffs' land, the soil conditions, topography
and vegative cover on the land before the construction
of the canal. Exhibits l, 2, 3 and 4 are air photos of the
plaintiffs' land taken in 1946, 1952, 1958, and 1965,
respectively. The plaintiffs' land is circled on each map
in red. It will be noted from the photographs that although the surrounding land was obviously cultivated
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and producing agricultural crops, the involved land
was, until after its purchase by the plaintiffs, in its native
condition and was described by Mr. Greenhalgh as
follows:
" ... Q . ..1.-lnd. when you went out in 1958, I will
ask you what the property was being used for, if
anything?

A. It was idle at the time except for pasture.
There might have been a few livestock in it, in
pasture.

Q. Will you describe the ground and the presence or absence of vegetation in the area on that
land and the type of vegetation, if you recall?
A. The land has a topography that is undulating, undulating means little hills and hummocks,
low depressions, various spots through it. In the
northwest corner of the property is a higher area
on which there was sagebrush. Among this sagebrush was also growin,g junegrass and early
grasses which die out in the summertime. Towards
the center portion and the south portion of the
area, there were salt grasses growing and then
there was an area towards the south end which
is an area which was irregular in shape, which
also had some sagebrush growing on it. There
were various spots throughout the area, small depressions, where there was no vegetation whatsoever growing in these various areas .... " (Tr.
142, 143)

Mr. Greenhalgh testified that many auger holes
were drilled on the land now owned by the plaintiffs
to test the soil and to determine the depth to water in
1950. The water table was high in much of the land.
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(Tr. 135-138) There was a pond on part of it. (Tr.
37).

The plaintiffs purchased the land in question 011
May 31, 1962. (Tr. 17) It was described by the plaintiff Delmar White as follows:

Q. Well, do you remember when you
bought it in 1962 whether there was about fifty
percent in sagebrush?
1

'.

•

•

A. It would be about fifty percent, scattered.
Q. \Vas it all in one part of it?
A. No, it wasn't.
Q. Where was it?
A. It was scattered here and there on the knolls
and all over the property.
Q. Was the property a series of knolls with
brush and then the land in between the knolls
alkali and with alkali type grass growing there?

A. It was native grasses. I couldn't tell you
that, Sir.

Q. There was a pond on it?
A. There was a pond that stayed during the
spring that water would drain to it and then
evaporate during the summer.
Q. Do you know whether the pond was a salt
water pond?
A. I couldn't tell you." (Tr. 41, 42)

Work on the canal was started by the digging of a
drain. (Tr. 174) The drain was about eight or nine
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feet deep and twenty-five to thirty feet wide and was
constructed past what is now the White property on
the 18th and 19th of March, 1962. (Tr. 173) The drain
was located along the east side of the canal site to dewater the area. (Tr. 175) The Willard Canal was under
construction from 1962 to 1964 and the deep drain was
in operation during that period. (Tr. 175) The effect
of the deep drain was to de-water not only the place
where the canal was constructed but also the surrounding area including the plaintiffs' land. See the chart,
Exhibit 9, and the testimony of Mr. Wallace. (Tr.
212-217-B) . After the completion of the canal, the
ground water was restored to its high pre-canal elevation. (Tr. 217-A, 217-B) The barley crop shown on
the plaintiffs' photos, Exhibits A-1 and A-2, was planted
in the Fall of 1963 after the deep drain was constructed
and in operation and was harvested in 1964. Another
good crop was planted in 1962 and harvested in 1963.
(Tr. 24) . When the drain became inoperative after
the completion of the canal in 1964 the water table
rose as depicted in Exhibit 9, substantially to its pre·
canal elevation and destroyed the crop. 'Ve quotl! from
the testimony of Mr. Greenhalgh:
" ... Q. The Exhibit. I think Mr. Skeen will
probably bring it out when he questions you.

Now, I show you Exhibit A-1 and A-2, which
are two colored· photographs and assuming that
those represented pictures of the crops on the
\Vhite property in the Fall of 196-.l<, would it still
be your opinion that these lands are not suitable
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for agriculture? I think those are the words you
used.
A. \,Ye were referring to the land classification.
Q. When you were discussing that, I think you
made the statement.
A. At the time the land classification was
taken, it was not suitable for agriculture under
the conditions that it was then in.
Q. All right. What about 1964 when these pictures were taken?
A. In 1964 when these pictures were taken,
two years after we had our initial construction
of the Willard Canal which was a deep portion
taken out of the center portion of the Canal for
the purpose of lowering the watertable, during
these two years the watertable was lowered as
much as four feet throughout the area. The watertable being lowered made it such that the crops
could be grown .... " (Tr. 158, 159)
The carefully prepared engineering and scientific
data in evidence and the air photos are undisputed in
the record. The expert testimony of engineers expressing opinions of the position and movement of ground
water before and after construction of the Willard
canal and their conclusion that the operation of the
canal could not raise the ground water level above its
elevation under pre-canal conditions will be referred
to in the argument.
At the close of the testimony the defendant made
a motion for a directed verdict dismissing the action
upan the grounds, first, that the evidence ''does not
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disclose any cause of action whatever, under any theory
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the Weber Basin
Water Conservancy District." Secondly, that '·there
is no evidence of damage of any character to the plaintiffs' land either by raising the water table in the land
or by leakage of water from the canal . . . " (Tr. 260261) The court reserved its ruling on the motion ( R.
261) and submitted three special interrogatories to the
jury as follows :
" ... Do you find it proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that the Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District is a real party in interest
in this proceeding? . . ."
" ... Do you find it proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that the construction of the canal
in the manner in which it was constructed has in
fact caused the water level on the plaintiffs' land
to be raised to a point where substantial damages
have accrued to them? ..."
" ... Do you find it proven by a clear preponderance of the evidence that at the time the deed
was granted by the Taylors for the release of
their lands for the construction of the canal in
question that the damages which you have found
in interrogatory number two were of such a gross
nature or of a different nature than any contemplated or forseeable so that it can be fairly said
that the bargain reached between the Taylors and
those they dealt with did not include a contemplation of a risk of this type being accepted in ownership of the land as it continues? ... " (Tr. 298)
Timely exceptions were taken to the interrogatories, in writing, as follows:
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" ... 1. Excepts to the first interragatory contained in instruction No. 3 for the reason that
such interrogatory would submit to the jury a
question of law which should be determined by
the court. The evidence is uncontradicted that the
Willard Canal was located, planned, designed,
constructed and operated by the United States,
that it is located on land acquired by the United
States and that the United States did not request
or direct the District to acquire the right of way
for the 'Villard Canal from the Taylors, predecessors of the plaintiff's. There is not a single
controverted issue of fact which would have any
bearing on the legal determination of whether the
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District is the
proper defendant.

2. Excepts to the second interrogatory for the
reasons (a) that it is beyond the issues framed
by the pleadings because it covers water other
than ''canal waters," which allegedly entered
upon the plaintiffs' land (see paragraphs 8 and
9 of the amended complaint) and (b) the wording is so general that the jury may answer "yes"
because the water level on the plaintiffs' land,
which was lowered by the deep drain to de-water
the area during the construction of the 'Villard
Canal, returned to its former level, when after
the completion of the canal the operation of the
deep drain was discontinued (see Exhibit 9) .
The plaintiffs are not entitled to have their land
drained by the continued operation of the deep
drain, and there was no invasion of their rights
unless it was shown that the water level was higher after construction of the canal than it was before construction.
3. Excepts to the third interrogatory for the

10

reasons (a) as a matter of law any claim for additional compensation arising out of the contract
of sale by the Taylors of land to the United
States for the construction of the Willard Canal
belongs to the Taylors and there is no evidence
that such claim was assigned by the Taylors to
the plaintiffs. The Taylor deed to the United
States is dated August 22, 1961 and the deed
from the Taylors to the plaintiffs is dated M~y
31, 1962. The mere deeding of the land from the
Taylors to the plaintiffs did not transfer to the
plaintiffs a claim for additional compensation;
(Mesich v. Board of County Commissioners, 40
N.M. 412, 129 P.2d 974) (b) that the contract
of sale which resulted in the delivery of the deed
by the Taylors to the United States was a contract between the United States and the Taylors
and it cannot be set aside and the compensation
cannot be increased without having both parties
to the contract before the court and proof of mistake of fact, fraud, imposition or other reason for
equitable relief. The necessary parties are not
before the court and no evidence to support the
setting aside of the contract has been adduced;
( c) that the use of the words "and those they
dealt with" is confusing and should be replaced
with "the United States" for there is no evidence
that the 'Taylors dealt with anyone other than
an employee of the United States; (d) there is
no evidence in the record as to the surrounding
circumstances or as to any other fact bearing on
the question as to what risks were in the contemplation of the parties when the right of way was
acquired by the United States .... " (R. 15, Tr.
264)
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The verdict of the jury was "yes" to each interrogatory. (Tr. 297-199) The court did not enter judgment
on the special verdict.
After further argument of the <lefendant's motion
for a directed verdict on December 2, 1968, the trial
court granted the motions. (Tr. 300) Findings of fact,
conclusions of law and a judgment were made and given.
(R. 23A, 23B).
The court found:
" ... 4. That said Willard Gravity Canal was

located, planned, designed and constructed exclusively by the United States of America, acting through the Secretary of the Interior and
since its construction has been operated exclusively by the United States. That the defendant
has not participated in any engineering work,
construction work upon, or operation and maintenance of said canal. That the land on which the
said canal is located, is, and at all times since construction of the canal began has been, owned by
the United States. That the defendant has not
participated in any respect in the acquisition of
land for construction of said Willard Canal e:+cept for the acquisition of one tract which was
obtained by the defendant and transferred to the
United States (which said tract is known as the
.Miller Tract and is not involved in this suit),
but all such land was acquired by the U nite<l
States .... " (R. 23a)
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'' ... 6. That in l\Iarch, 1962, the United States,

acting through the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior constructed a deep drain
immediately East of plaintiffs' land for the purpose of de-watering the area to facilitate the construction of the Willard Gravity Canal. That
said drain temporarily lowered the water table
in the surrounding lands including the plaintiffs'
lands during said construction, and when the
canal was completed in 1964 the use of the deep
drain was abandoned and the water table in the
surrounding lands raised to substantially the
same level as it was prior to construction. That
the construction, operation and maintenance of
the canal has not caused the plaintiffs' land to
become wet, soggy and interspersed with surf ace ponds and has not otherwise or in any respect
damaged plaintiffs' land. That no water has
leaked from the canal since its construction and
plaintiffs' land has not been flooded, seeped, submerged or otherwise affected by water from the
said Willard Gravity Canal. That no crops growing on the plaintiffs' land have been damaged or
destroyed by water from the Willard Gravity
Canal, or other source, as a result of any action,
inaction or condition created by or chargeable to
the defendant, nor has plaintiffs' land been damaged by reason of any action, inaction or condition created by or chargeable to the defendant .
. . ." (R. 23a)
The appeal is from the judgment based on findings
of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 20)
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STATEMENT 01<-. POINTS
I. The trial court properly dismissed thi~ action on

motion because the District is not the proper party
defendant.
2. The findings of fact are supported by undis-

puted evidence.
3. Assuming, arguendo, that there was a cause

of action against the defendant, it belonged to the
Taylors, who were estopped to assert it, and was not
assigned to the plaintiffs.

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THIS ACTION ON MOTION BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT THE
PROPER PARTY DEFENDANT.

When the parties rested the defendant moved for
dismissal on the ground that there was no evidence in
the record which would support a cause of action by
the plaintiffs and against the defendant on any theory.
The ruling on the motion was reserved by the court
for further argument and after argument, some two
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weeks after the trial, it was granted because the defendant was not the proper party to be sued.
The question in this case which logically should
be considered first is whether the defendant is liable
for damage to the plaintiffs' land caused by the construction of the Willard Canal by the United States
under the applicable federal law, the repayment and
amendatory repayment contracts and the undisputed
facts discussed above. We assume for the sake of argument only, but do not admit, that there was damage
suffered.
The facts detailed above that the Willard Canal
is one of the project works of the Weber Basin Project;
that it was constructed under the Reclamation Act;
pursuant to the repayment contract, Exhibit D, which
is in evidence; that it was located, designed, constructed
and operated exclusively by the United States; that
the right of way for the canal, (except the Miller tract)
was acquired by the United States; that the United
States is the owner of the Willard Canal and took title
to a part of the Riley Taylor tract; that the remainder
of such tract was later sold to the plaintiffs and that
the defendant had no part in designing, constructing
or operating the canal or acquiring the right of wa~·
therefor are all undisputed in the record
The plaintiffs take the position, as we understand
it, that the defendant is the proper party defendant
as they construe the repayment contract. They point
out that many cases have been filed by the defendant
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to condemn land for the Weber Basin Project; that in
some instances title ha.s been taken in the name of the
United States and in some cases title has been acquired
by the defendant; that the transaction between the
United States and the defendant was a loan; that the
United States retained "naked title to the project
works" as security for the repayment of the sum advanced, and that " ... after payment has been made
the title to the project works which has been retained
by the United States is subject to being transferre<l
to the defendant pursuant to an act of Congress." See
appellants' brief pp. 25-35. In effect, the appellants
argue that either the defendant is the principal and the
United States is the agent; that the defendant is the
purchaser of the project works under a contract of
purchase or that the United States is the money lender
and the defendant is the borrower.
In making sueh an argument the plaintiffs ignore
the basic Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, (32 Stat.
388), 43 USCA 372 et seq., the Act of August 29,
1949 ( 63 Stat. 677) which authorized the Weber Basin
Project, the repayment contract, Exhibit D, and the
undisputed facts regarding the design, construction
and the operation of the Willard Canal, and the actual
acquisition of right of way for the Canal.
Sections 2, 4, and 6 of the Reclamation Act, supra,
insofar as pertinent provide:
"Sec. 2 .... That the Secretary of the Interior
is hereby authorized and directed to make exam-
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inatious and surveys for, and to locate and construct, as herein provided, irrigation works for
the storage, diversion and development of waters .
. . ." 43 USCA 411
"Sec. 4 . . . . That upon the <letermination by
the Secretary of the Interior that any irrigation
project is practicable, he may cause to be let contracts for the construction of the same. . . ." 43
USCA 419
"Sec. 6 .... That the title to an<l the management and operation of the reservoirs and the
works necessary for their protection and operation shall remain in the Government until otherwise provided by Congress." 43 USCA 491 and
498

"Sec. 7 .... That where in carrying out the provisions of this Act it becomes necessary to acquire
any right or property, the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to acquire the same for
the United States by purchase or condemnation .
. . ." 43 USCA 421
Section l of the Act of August 2g, 1949, ( 63 Stat.
677) provides in part:
'' ... That the Secretary of the Interior, through
the Bureau of Reclamation, is hereby authorized
to construct, operate and maintain the Weber
Basin Project...."
The repayment contract, Exhibit D, provides in
Article 2:
"'Vhereas, the United States has investigated,
planned and proposes to construct the Weber
Basin Project, herein styled the Project, for the
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diversion, storage and distribution of water of the
Weber River, and its tributaries, and water from
other sources, for irrigation, municipal and industrial use, generation of electric power, flood
control, recreation, fish and wildlife purposes,
and for the drainage of project land."
In Article 4 of the contract it is stated:
''a. The project works to be constructed by the
United States, include, without being limited by
enumeration, the following:

* * *

Conveyance System

* * *

Willard Gravity Canal will extend in a northerly
direction 10.8 miles from the Slaterville diversion
dam to the Willard Reservoir. It will convey
Weber River water to the reservoir and will supply irrigation water to the existing Plain City
and Warren Canals. The canal will be earth
lined and will have a maximum capicity of ll05
second-feet."
Article 6a provides :
"The District shall, at its own expense, negotiate for the acquisition of all lands and easements needed by the United States for the construction, ope.ration and maintenance of the project works, usmg for that purpose such forms of
contracts, deeds and other necessary papers as
are satisfactory to the Secretary. Upon procuring the execution of the necessary contracts,
deeds and other papers, the District shall transmit
them to the Re~ional Director of Region 4 of the
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Bureau of Reclamation, or such other officer as
may be designated by the Secretary. Payment of
the purchase price of lands and easements purchased will be made by the United States in due
course, if, in the opinion of the Secretary the
purchase price is reasonable and the instruments
of conveyance are in satisfactory form and show
satisfactory title in the United States."
Article 7 a provides:
"Subject to the terms and conditions of this
contract, the United States will expend on the
construction of the project works the sum of
seventy million, three hundred eighty-five thousand dollars ($70,385,000.00) or so much thereof',
as, in the opinion of the Secretary is necessary
for such purpose within the limit of funds made
available by the Congress, herein referred to as
the project cost. The District agrees to pay to the
United States the amount herein referred to as
the construction obligation. The District's construction obligation shall be the portion of the
project cost finally allocated by the Secretary
to irrigation and municipal and other water supply purposes as provided for in the Act of August
29, 1949 ( ()3 Stat. H77), but not to exceed $57,694,000. The portion of the project cost allocated
to flood control, recreation, and fish and wlidlifc
shall be nonreimbursable.
"
Article 10 provides:
"a. The District shall have the permanent and
exclusive use of all project water subject only to
(I) the right of the United States to exercise
control tl1ereovcr for flood control, recreational
and fish and wildlife purposes, consistent with
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the authorized project plan, and (2) the requirement that project water i~ excess of that necessary to satisfy project needs in any ~ear shall be
retained in reservoirs for future proJect use provided that such excess water may be withdrawn
from said reservoir in accordance with (I) above
but may not be disposed of for other than project purposes without prior approval of the Secretary.
b. The District shall make water allotments
and contracts for the disposal of project water
for irrigation, municipal and miscellaneous uses
in accordance with the applicable unit notice and
the Utah Water Conservancy District Act. Such
water allotments and contracts shall be upon
terms satisfactory to the Secretary, shall be approved by him in advance, and shall not be
amended without his written consent."
Article 23 provides:
''Title to the project works constructed or
acquired by the United States shall remain in the
United States until otherwise provided by the
Congress, notwithstanding transfer of the operation and maintenance of any such works to the
District."
.Ai·ticle 30 provides :
"The Secretary reserves the rights, so far as
the purport thereof may be consistent with the
provisions of this contract, to make reasonable
rules and regulations and to add to or modify
them as may be deemed proper and necessary to
carry out the trne intent and meaninIT
of the law
0
and of this contract."
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It is significant that the project was constructed

not only to make project water available to the defendant, but for purposes of flood control, recreation and
fish and wildlife. The money allocated to these purposes
is by Article 7a nonreimbursable and consistent therewith Article IO provides that the District's use of project
water is expressly subject to '' (I) the right of the
United States to exercise control thereof for flood control, recreation and fish and wildlife purposes consistent
with vhe authorized plan . . . " The public purpose of
the project is evident.
There is nothing in the contract which divests the
United States, acting through the Secretary, of its
authority to acquire rights of way for the Willard
Canal granted by section 7 of the Reclamation Act,
43 USCA 42I. In fact in Article 6a. the District is
obligated to acquire all lands and easements "needed by
the United States." The record is clear that the District was not requested to acquire Willard Canal right
of way needed by the United States, except for the
Miller tract not involved here. (Tr. 24I)
Defendant's Exhibit I I is an amendatory repayment contract dated June 30, I96I, which among other
amendments provides for new facilities, an increase
in constructoin and nonreimbursable costs, and for the
District to " . . . perform any or all actions necessary
in connection with the acquisition of lands required by
the United States ... " when "requested in writing by
the contracting officer." In Article I8 it is provided
that:
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" . . . this amendatory contract shall not be
binding upon the Uwited States nor shall any
water be delivered pursuant to this amendatory
contract until the proceedings on the part of the
District for the authorization of the execution of
the contract shall have been confirmed by decree
of a court of competent jurisdiction. . . . " (emphasis added)
The amendatory contract was executed by both
parties before the Taylor deed dated August 22, 1961
was obtained by the United States. (Exhibit C).
It will be noted that Article 18 does not provide
that the contract shall nut be binding on the District
until a confirmatory decree is obtained and Article 18
does not provide that the contract shall have no force
or effect whatever ( ar argued by the plaintiffs) until
confirmed. It simply provides that the United States
was not bound until the contract was confirmed. We
emphatically state that the District was not bound to
obtain right of way until requested by the United States
so to do under both the original and amendatory contracts. No such request was made of the defendant to
acquire the Taylor tract. (Tr. 241)

The federal law and the contract provisions quoted
and discussed above effectually dispose of the appellants' argument that the 'Veber Basin Project actually
belongs to the defendant; that the repayment contract
evidences merely a loan with the United States hidincr
b
the "naked title to the project works" as security and
that the United States is only an agent of the defendant
District.

22

The courts have uniformly held that the repayment entity (the defendant is such entity in this case)
acts as fiscal agent for the United States on projects
constructed pursuant to the Reclamation Act and under
similar repayment contracts.
In the case of Twin Jl'alls Canal Co. v. American
Jl'alls Re8ervoir Dist. No. 2, 59 F.2d 19 (Ninth Circuit--cert. denied 387 U.S. 638) the court had under
consideration a repayment contract very similar to tLe
one involved in this action. The court held:
". . . Two questions are presented: First, is
American Falls reservoir district No. 2 a party
in interest-the proper party defendant?
"It is obvious from the findings of fact and
the record that not only is title to the system in
issue in the United States, but that it has exclusive control and entire supervision of construction and will have until the project is completed,
and the management and operation will remain
in it until otherwise provided by the Congress.
43 USCA Sections 498, 523, 524. Livanis v.
Northport Irr. Dist., 121 N eh. 777, 238 N.W.
757; Id., 120 Neb. 314, 232 N.W. 583.

"Appellee has ha<l no power over, or voice, control, or po~er in the management, control, or
operation of the works or project, and no conceivable theory is pointed out, nor is such known
to the court, how trespass of the United States
in such construction, maintenance, or operation
can be charged against appellee, :Malone v. El
Paso County \Yater Imp. Dist. No. 1 (Tex. Civ.
App.) 20 S.\V. (2d) 815. There is no distinction
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between the principle involved in the 1\!Ialone
Case and that involved in the instant case. The
maintenance, operation, control, etc., in each case
was in the United States, and section 6 of the
Federal Reclamation Act ( 43 USCA Sections
491, 498) applies to each. The findings supported
by the evidence, are conclusive that appellee had
not succeeded to the management, operation of
control; and that is the decisive factor. The nature of the claim is not material. No liability
against appellee is established.... "
In the case of Jtlalonc v. El Paso County Water
Improvement District No. 1, (Tex. Civ. App.) 20
S.W. 2d 815, the court had before it a case involving
a federal reclamation project and the usual repayment
contract. The question arose as to whether the repayment entity, a water improvement district, was liable
f'or damages resulting from a canal break. The court
said:
'' ... After a careful examination of the statutes, state and federal, relating thereto and two
contracts pleaded by plaintiff, we find no provision giving to defendant a voice, much less control or joint control or joint acting with the
United States government in the construction,
operation, or maintenance of the irrigation works.
The state statute, federal reclamation law and
'
the two contracts, we think state all the duties
and fix all the liabilities of defendant as such
fiscal agent, and beyond which defendant has no
duties or power to act, or power to assume or incur a liability; defendant is a creature of the
statute...."
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The case of Livanis v. Northport Irr. Dist., 121
Neb. 777, 238 N.W. 757, also involved a reclamation
project constructed by the United States under the
Reclamation Act. The contention was made that the
repayment contract created such legal relationship that
the District was operating the irrigation system through
the instrumentality of the United States. The court
held:
"However, the contract must be construed
with reference to the federal and state statutes,
which are as much apart thereof as though incorporated into the body of it. The powers, duties
and liabilities of the district and the United States
are only such as each is authorized by statute to
assume. The federal statute applicable to this
case is 43 USCA Sections 523, 524. These statutes authorize the secretary of the interior to dispose of surplus water impounded for the purpose
of irrigating public lands to, among others, irrigation districts. The method of carrying out the
provisions of this act is provided in that canals
and ditches may be constructed. It is also provided that, when the payments required by the
act are made, then the management and operation of such irrigation works shall pass to the
owners of the land, to be maintained at their
expense under such rules and regulations as may
be acceptable to the secretary of the interior. It
is further provided that the title to and the management and operation of the reservoirs and the
works necessary for their protection and operation shall remain in the government until other~ise provided by congress. Surely there is nothing
m the federal statutes which indicates, that, in
the construction, maintenance and operation of
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irrigation works, the United States was to become the contractor for, or the agent of, the irrigation districts formed to take advantage of its
facilities for impounding and carrying water to
the land. In effect, the federal statutes negative
such a relationship, by the retention of title to the
works; by absolute control of the construction
and maintenance; and finally by providing that
when the works are eventually turned over to the
district it shall be under such rules and regulations as are acceptable to the secretary of the interior.

* * *

"The relationship between the United States
and the district must be determined from the contract and the statutes, both state and federal. The
only obligation thus asswned by the district is to
collect and pay-collect from the landowners
and pay the United States. The contract requires
the United States to (I) store water in the Pathfinder reservoir; ( 2) grant to lands in the district
a perpetual water right; ( 3) to use its carriage
right in Farmers Irrigation District canal for
benefit of district; ( 4) to construct the necessary
irrigation works to irrigate the lands in the district; ( 5) to construct drainage works, and ( 6) to
operate and maintain the system until the district complies with certain conditions; while the
only obligation of the district is to collect and
repay the money to the United States. This relationship has been denominated that of fiscal
agent. Malone v. El Paso County Water Improvement District (Tex. Civ. App.) 20 S.\V.
(2d) 815. See, also, Twin Falls Canal Co. v.
American Falls Reservoir District No. 2 (D.C.)
49 F. (2d) 632 ...."
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The cases of Davis v. Lugert,-Altws Irrigation Dit>trict, .... Okl. .... , 375 P.2d 975; Klamath Irrigation
Dist v. Carlson, 176 Ore. 336, 157 P.2<l 514; and Omaha

Life Ins. Co. v. Gering & Ft. Laramie Irr. Dist, 123

Neb. 761, 244 N.W. 296, all involved federal reclamation projects and the legal relationship of the United
States and an irrigation district which served as the
repayment entity under contracts similar to those here
involved. In the Davis case the court held that the
district was not liable for alleged damage caused by
seepage from a project canal because there had been
no proof of transfer of the operation and maintenance
to the district. In the Klmnath case the court held that
the alleged negligence of the United States while in
control of the operation and maintenance of an irrigation system could not be imputed to the irrigation
district.
The court said:
" ... To overcome the effect of the f e<leral control of the maintenance, upkeep and operation of
the system, the allegation is made by defendant
that such control is a subterfuge and a fraud; and
it is also alleged that a major portion of the cost
of the project had been paid by plaintiff district.
These allegations of fraud and payment were
not proved.
"The right to the control by the United States
Government of the irrigation project in suit attended its initial installation and continued until
payments by the owners of the land irrigatc<l
were made as required by the Act of Congress of
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June 17, 1902, for the major portion of the reclamation or construction charges due the United
States and allocable against plaintiff district,
Vol. 32 U.S. Stat. Chap. 1093, p. 388 et seq.
'"The record before us discloses that it was not
until the month of lVIarch in the year 1942, that
payments, made in accordance with the provisions
of said Act of Congress of June 17, 1902, by the
irrigable landowners in plaintiff district aggregated the major portion required therefrom.
''No claim is ma<le or suggested that prior to
payment for said major portion of the construction charges, plaintiff requested the Secretary of
the Interior to transfer to pla_intiff the care, operation or maintenance of all or any part of the
project works in suit, or that the Secretary of the
Interior made any such transfer pursuant to the
proviso in Section 5 of the Act of Congress on
August 13, 1914. Vol. 38 U.S. Stat. Chap. 247,
p. 686 et seq, 43 U.S.C.A. Section 492.
"The alleged negligence of the United States
Government, while in control of the operation,
maintenance and conduct of the irrigation system in suit, could not be imputed to plaintiff;
hence no suit or action based on such alleged negligence could be maintained by defendant aaainst
plaintiff. Livanis v. Northport Irrigation° District, 120 Neb. 314, 232 N.W. 583, affirmed on
rehearing, 121 Neb. 777, 238 N.,V. 757; Malone
v. El Paso County Imp. Dist. No. 1, Tex. Civ.
App., 20 S.W. 2d 815; Twin Falls Canal Co. v.
American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2, D.C. 49
F.2d 632, affirmed on appeal, 9 Cir., 59 F.2d
19.... "
In the Omaha case, which involved alleged leakage of
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water from a government canal, the court affirmed a
directed verdict for the irrigation district because the
evidence was insufficient to show that such leakage was
a contributing cause of the wet condition of the land.
In the case of Spurrier v ..lJJ.itchell Irr. Dist., 119
Neb. 401, 229 N.W. 273, involving seeped lands and
a claim for relief under a constitutional provision similar
to that in the Utah Constitution, the court said:
". . . The defendants in this case having the
undoubted right to convey to and turn water
upon the land under their canals and ditches, and
not being liable for damages resulting to adjacent land therefrom, except upon the allegation
and proof of neglegence, and no such allegation
or proof having been made in this case, there is
not invasion of property. In order to recover
under this self-executing section of the Constitution Hopper v. Douglas County, 75 N eh. 332,
106 N.W. 331), property must be taken or damaged for a public use. The method of taking or
damaging must violate the rights of the owner
thereof. It is not established in this case that any
right of plaintiffs has been violated. The cases
and authorities cited by the plaintiffs supporting
their claim upon this theory do not support the
view that the owner of a servient tenement may
recover from a dominant tenement. In the absence of negligence in the construction, maintenance, operation and use of its irrigation works,
an irrigation district is not liable to an owner of
land for seepage under section 21, art. l, of the
Constitution. Such negligence neither being alleged nor proved in this case, there can be no recovery...."
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Inverse condemnation relied upon by the plaintiff's
is the remedy for a taking of property for public purposes without compensation. To make a case under
this theory it is, of course, essential that the defendant
do an act which constitutes a taking or causes damage
to a property right or in some manner actually participated therein.
The plaintiffs' argument is that the defendant is
the proper party defendant because it has, in the past,
filed numerous cases to acquire right of way for Weber
Ilasin Project works. The seven actions cited on pages
26 and 27 of the appellants' brief as disclosed by the
opinions were filed to obtain land and easements for
the Willard Reservoir, the enlarged Pineview Reservoir
and other works pursuant to Article 6 of the repayment
contract, and was a real party in interest under Rule
17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, at the request of
the United States. The United States did not request
the defendant to acquire right of way for the Willard
Canal (except for the Miller tract not involved herein) .
(Tr. 241, 242}.
The district court case of Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. 11racy-Collins Bank & Trust Co.,
et al (see Exhibit E4), was filed by the defendant to
acquire an easement for its own pipeline which was not
a part of the federal project. See the testimony of Mr.
Kostoff. (Tr. 248)
The plaintiffs have cited two cases in support of
their argument that the District is the proper party
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defendant, State v. Leeson, 323 P.2d 692, 84 Ariz. 44
(appellants' brief p. 33), and Clement v. State Recreation Board, 35 Cal. 2d. 628, 220 P.2d 897, (p. 34 of
appellants' brief).
Neither case involved a reclamation project and
in both cases the defendants were held responsible because they performed acts which directly caused the
damage under cooperative agreements. In the second
case cited above the State paid half the construction
costs, purchased the land for rights of way and flowage
and participated with the federal agencies in the planning of the project. Responsibility for the control of
the project was " ... vested concurrently in state and
federal governments." 220 P. 2d at p. 907). Both
cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
On page 37 of its brief the plaintiffs argue that the
defendant is trying vigorously to extricate itself from
liability because '' . . . technical considerations bar a
direct suit against the United States . . . " No cases
are cited to support this rash statement. The law is to
the contrary. See United States v. Kansas City Life
Ins. Co., 339 U.S.799, 94 L.Ed. 1277, cited on pages
19 and 20 of the appellants' brief. See also United
States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17,2 L.Ed. 2d ll09.
28 USC, Chap. 85, sec. 1346, subd (a) par 2
28 USC, Chap. 91, sec. 1491
See Cha plc:r XXlX, Nichols on Eminent Domain.
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We submit that under the facts of this case, the
provisions of the Reclamation Act, the repayment contract and amendatory contract and the decisions in the
case of Twin Falls Canal Co. v. American Falls Reservoir District No. 2, and other cases cited above, the defendant was merely the fiscal agent of the United
States, and is not liable. This point is determinative of
this case and the judgment of the district court should
be affirmed.
2. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUP-

PORTED BY UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE.

The trial court made findings of fact which are
briefly summarized as follows:
I. That the defendant is a water conservancy

district.

2. That the plaintiffs are the owners of the land
which is the subject of this action.
3. That in accordance with the repayment contract,

the defendant is entitled to the use of Weber Basin
project water. The operation of the Willard Canal is
described.
4. The finding is quoted in full on page 12 of this

brief.

5. The United States acquired land from Riley
E. Taylor and "f\'ife for the canal location which was
formerly a part of the parcel now owned by the plaintiffs.
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6. This finding is quoted in full on pages 12, 13 of

this brief.
Findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5 are not controversial and are supported by admissions in the pleadings and documentary evidence. Findings of fact Nos.
4 and 6 are supported by the evidence discussed below
even though such evidence is considered in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs.

Finding of Fact No. 4.
The testimony of engineers Greenhalgh and Kostoff is that the United States located, designed, constructed and operated the Willard Canal. (Tr. 135,
148, 149, 249). The applicable provisions of the Reclamation Act and the provisions of the repayment contract discussed above, all uncontroverted, support the
first two sentences of finding No. 4. The right of way
for the canal was acquired by the United States. (Tr.
172, 183) and title is in the United States. (Exhibit
C). The testimony of 0. B. Birch, which is also uncontradicted, establishes that the defendant had nothing
to do with the acquisition of land for the Willard Canal
(except the Miller tract which is not here -involved) .
(Tr. 241, 242) The defendant had nothing to do with
the negotiations for the right of way. (Tr. 124, 125)
This undisputed testimony supports the remaining sentence of paragraph 4 of the findings.
Finding of Fact No. 6.
'The first three st..:utences of finding of fact No. 6
relating to the construction cf the deep drain along the
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east side of the plaintiffs' land to de-water the area
and its effect on the land during construction from
1962 to 1964 is supported by the testimony of engineers, Greenhalgh, Eldredge and \Vallace. (Tr. 147,
159, 173, 17 4, 17 5, 212-217H). Exhibit 9, which
graphically shows the lowering of the water table from
1962 to 1964 and the restoring of the water table to
its pre-canal level after completion of the canal, is based
upon actual measurements and is uncontradicted in
the record. In fact, the testimony of the plaintiff,
Delmar White, corroborates the findings and conclusions of the engineers as to the lowering and raising of
the water table. (Tr. 22-25, 49-53, ti2) The testimony
mentioned above, the air photos, the engineering reports
and Exhibit 9 are all uncontroverted by any competent
evidence. The testimony of Clyde Hancock, who was
not an engineer (Tr. 104) but was a laborer and maintenance mechanic (Tr. 115) did not controvert the
testimony mentioned above as to the effect of the deep
drain during construction. His conclusions about the
hardpan condition in the canal site did not inject into
the case a jury question for two reasons: ( 1) It was
not sufficiently definite to establish that there was a
water impervious stratum of sufficient extent to confine ground water, and (2) On cross examination he
made it clear that he was only guessing by stepping
to Exhibit 4 and drawing with a blue pencil the area
on the plaintiffs' land covered by the hardpan although
he had drilled no holes or conducted any investigation
to locate the hardpan in that area. (Tr. 110-113)
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The plaintiffs pleaded in their amended complaint
that water from the Willard Canal Hooded, seeped,
submerged and otherwise affected their land (R. 7,
par. 8). On cross examination, Mr. White admitted
that the water in his land was not leaking from the
canal, but blamed the wet condition on the hardpan
being broken. (Tr. 67) The abandonment of the claim
of leakage is admitted in the appellants' brief p. 6. In
fact, on page 18 the plaintiffs abandon all claims that
the damage was caused by more water or a higher water
table in their land.
There is no proof m the record that any action
or inaction or condition chargeable to the defendant
caused ::my loss of crops or damage to the plaintiffs'
land. Mr. White himself testified that the damage was
caused by increased water pressure. (Tr. 29) There
is no proof that any act of the defendant cause this.
The following expert opinions of engineers relating
to the effect of constructing and operating the canal
are uncontradicted in the record and further support
Finding No. 6.
Mr. Greenhalgh:
" ... Q. Based on your study of the area and the
soil and the results of the drill holes that were
put there by the Bureau of Reclamation, do you
have an opinion as to whether the construction
of a canal along the east side of the land would
cause the ground water to rise to the surface
where it didn't rise before?
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A. I see no reason whatsoever, no explanation
as to why it should rise, due to the construction
of the canal in the manner in which we constructed it.
Q. Could water have risen to the surface by
reason of fracturing any part of the soil in that
area, that you found in that area?

A. Any soil that we encountered was pervious
before we went in there. We couldn't increase
the perviousness by digging through it .... " (Tr.
147)

Mr. Eldredge:
" ... Q. Did you encounter in digging the canal
anything that could be considered an impervious
blanket which would hold ground water down?

A. No. Your cemented sands are not as impervious as your regular sand, the permeability
rate is much smaller, but the water could go
through them.
Q. And that, you say was sporatic?
A. Yes, it wasn't consistent over the whole
canal.

Q. 'Vas there anything to confine water to a
lower depth that it would rise to, if you broke
through it?
A. No, the majority of our water, we found,
was above the cemented sand layer.
" (Tr.
174, 175)

Mr. Wallace:
" ... Q. I will ask you for au expert's opinion
as to whether in your opinion the construction of
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the canal across the east side of the 'Vhite property has had any effect upon the level of ground
water in the 'Vhite land 1
A. It has, only to the effect that when the
canal is lowered or when it was during construction the water table was lowered, other than
that, when the canal is in normal operation; in my
opinion, it would have no effect on the water
table.

Q. Is there any possibility, in your opinion, of
the existence of the canal structure as located of
raising the water table under any conditions in
the White property?

A. No .... " (Tr. 217-C)
Q. Now, I will ask you, .Mr. Wallace, if
you can, as a hydrologist, visualize the situation
where ground water would be held down in the
ground by a layer of hardpan. Do you think that
situation could ~xist?
1

' •

••

A. Yes, it could.
Q. On the White property?

A. No, not from the evidence that I have heard
here, certainly not. In order for it to exist where
pressure was underneath the hardpan and by
punching a hole it would be relieving the pressure, you would have to have the hardpan over
an entire area so that the water accumulating
under that hardpan came from a higher elevation
and was held down only by that hardpan and
could seek and could not get out any other way
except to puncture that hardpan, but if there is
anyway for water to escape, water bv law seeks
its own level, and unless you have a c~mplete im-
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pervious zone covering it, such as whe~e you have
an artesian well, probably you are drillmg down
deep where we have deep wells where water may
push upto the surface, that is a condition where
an impervious layer is holding the water down
and by punching a hole through it it relieves
pressure bringing the water to the surface, but
you have to have this layer over the entire area
to keep that pressure.
Q. Now, if the impervious or nearly impervious
layer were sporadically located around in a given
area, could that possibly hold the water down?
A. No, it couldn't.
Q. So the fracturing of those intermittent pervious or impervious areas would have no effect on
the level of the ground water?
A. Absolutely not. Water seeks its own level
and would have otherwise come up other places
first.

Q. Now, would you step to the aerial photo?
Defendant's Exhibit 3, please.
Assuming for the sake of this question that
there was an impervious area of hardpan so noted
in blue on Exhibit 3, and assuming that that impervious area is continuous over that area marked
in blue, in your opinion would the fracturing of
the blue area on the east side cause any change
in the natural water elevation of ground water on
the tract surrounded by the red and green lines?
A. If it were as shown on here the water in
seeking its own level would work around this
edge. It would work around this edge or any
edge and find it5 own level up above this hardpan
so that by putting a hole through, it is just like
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putting your hand down in water, the fact that
you put your hand down in water doesn't mean
that the water is going to be stopped from coming
above your hand. It goes around and on top of
your hand. By the same token, if this hardpan
were in here the water would go around the edges
of it, if it indeed were solid and would come up
on top of the hardpan from the sides.
" (Tr.
217-E, 218)

The argument of appellant is that the operation
of the canal and the drain system and flap valves ref erred to in the testimony will fluctuate the ground
water elevation in the VVhite property causing damage.
We quote from page 18 of the appellants' brief:
" ... Certainly, there is not the slightest question but that the underground water table in the
area is affected whenever the canal is emptied
and that, if nothing more, the surging and resurging of the ground water table from time to
time would be in and of itself be adequate to dislodge the previously existing alkaline strata so
as to cause the alkali minerals to permeate all of
the White properties even if the maximum heights
of the water table were only occasionally raised.
"

The plaintiffs' description of the damage complained of relates to underground water coming to the
surface and is very general. The above quoted statement presupposes that the plaintiffs have a right to
the use of underground water and a right to have the
water table remain unchanged. There is no record to
support such claims. The claimed right to have the water
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table maintained at a constant elevation is not recognized under Utah law. N. M. Long Co. v. CannonPapanikolas Comt. Co., 9 Utah 2d 307, 343 P.2d llOO;
Weber Basin Wat.er Cons. Dist. v. Gailey, 8 Utah 2d
55, 328 P.2d 175.

The only evidence as to the effect of the operation
of the flap valves is given by the government engineers.
Nothing is said by any witness about the "surging and
re-surging" of the ground water table and there is not
a word in the record that the "alkaline strata" would
be dislodged and that the alakali minerals would "permeate all of the White properties."
The evidence is that the flap valves would operate
only when the canal is empty and that would seldom
occur. It would occur only when the canal was being
constructed or under repair. (Tr. 196) At the time
of the trial it had not been empty long enough to check
the operation of the flap valves. (Tr. 226). Also, the
testimony is that the reaction of the elevation of the
ground water to changes in the water content of the
canal would be very slow. (Tr. 225A, 237). This is
entirely inconsistent with any "surging and re-surging."
We submit that there was no evidence to support
the claim of alleged damages, by leakage of water from
the canal, breaking of hardpan or surging of the underground water. The trial court did not err by granting
the motion for a directed verdict of dismissal.
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ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, 'l' HAT
THERE WAS A CAUSE O.F' ACTION
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, IT llELONGED TO THE TAYLORS, WHO WERE
ESTOPPED TO ASSERT IT, AND WAS NOT
ASSIGNED TO THE PLAINTIFFS.
3.

Assuming for the purposes of argument only that
there was actionable damage to the plaintiffs' land, under
the theory of inverse condemnation or any other theory,
a very pertinent question arises as to whether the cause
of action belongs to the plaintiffs. This question was
raised in the court below by excepting to the third
interrogatory as set out at pages 10 and 11 of thi~ brief.
The record is clear that the United States acquired
from Riley Taylor and wife a deed to a small tract
of land to be used for the canal. (Tr. 125) The consideration paid covered the value of the land and for
cutting off a source of livestock water. (Tr. 128). The
deed from Taylor to the United States is dated August
22, 1961 (Exhibit C).
The Taylors' remaining land was conveyed to the
plaintiffs by deed dated May 31, 1962. (Tr. 17) There
is no evidence in the record of any transfer by assignment or by other instrument of a cause of action against
the defendant or the United States as a result of the
taking.
The law is well settled that a claim for additional
compensation does not follow the land but must be
transferred by separate instrument.
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30 C.J.S. 461:

Putnam v. Oklahoma Cit/j, 203 Old., 570, 224
P.2d 270; Long v. City of 1~ulsa, 199 Okl., 217,
184 P.2d 800; Markiewicus v. Methuen, 300
.Mass., 560, 16 N.E. 2d 32; Alabama G. ~ S.R.
Co. v. Brown, 215 Ala. 533, 112 So. 131; Duke
Power Co. v. Rutla:nd, 4 Cir., 60 F.2d 194; McElr<Y!J v. Borough of Ft. Lee, 3 Cir. 46 F.2d 777.
Cert. Den, 283 U.S. 853; 1'aylor Inv. Co. v. Kansas City Power~ Light Co., 182 Kan. 511, 322
P.2d 817; Garver v. Public Service Com. 77
N .M. 262, 421 P .2d 788.
In the M cE lro y case the court said :
" ... The right of compensation is a personal
one and does not run with the land. 20 C. J. 1185.
The owner of the land at the time the right is invaded or the trespass committed is entitled to recover and the subsequent vendee of such an owner
takes the land subject to the right of his injured
predecessor to exact and receive the compensation. Kindred v. Union Pacific Railroad, 225
U.S. 582, 32 S. Ct. 780, 56 L.Ed. 1216; Central
R. Co. of New Jersey v. Hetfield, 29 N.J. Law,
206 ...."
The Taylors, when they granted the land to the
United States, estopped themselves from claiming any
damage, present or future, which might reasonably be
expected to occur from the necessary, natural and ordinary use of the property for the construction of the
\Villard Canal by the United States. Williams v. SuterBntte Canal Co., 82 Cal. 2d 100, 18;) P.2d 664, awl
cases cited therein. There is no evidence in the record
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which would show that the Taylors did not anticipate
that the water table in the land would be lowered during
the construction of the Willard Canal and that after
construction the water table would be restored to its
original level, for this obviously is the natural, necessary
and ordinary use to which the property would be put by
the grantee. The case of Albers v. Los Angeles County,
42 Cal. Reptr. 89, 389 P. 2d 129, cited on Page 25 of
appellants' brief is not in point because the damages
there were not a natural, necessary or reasonable incident to the construction of the road and making the
fill. (P. 138, 389 P.2d).

CONCLUSION
The trial court properly dismissed this action on
Motion of the defendant upon the ground, among others,
that the District is not the proper party defendant. The
Weber Basin Project, including the Willard Canal,
is a federal reclamation projec't and under applicable
federal statutes and the repayment contract and amendatory contract the defendant acts only as fiscal agent
for the United States, with no participation in the design and construction of project facilities and with no
participation in the acquisition of right of way and the
operation of project works, except upon the request
of the United States. The evidence is undisputed that
the defendant was not requested to acquire the right
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of way across the land now owned by the plaintiffs and
had no part in the operation of the canal.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiffs, does not prove damage to the plaintiffs'
land resulting from the construction and operation of
the canal. That the canal did not leak is admitted in the
appellants' brief, and the testimony of experts is uncontradicted that the breaking of hardpan and the
operation of flap valves in the canal would not cause
the ground water to rise above its pre-canal level. There
is no evidence of the "surging and resurging" of the
ground water table as claimed by the plaintiffs.
The United States acquired part of the land iu
question from the plaintiffs' predecessors Riley E.
Taylor and wife and any taking which would support
an inverse condemnation action took place while the
Taylors owned the land. The conveyance of the land
by deed to the plaintiffs would not carry with it a cause
of action for additional compensation. The judgment
of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Neil R. 0 lmstead
E. J. Skeen
Attorneys for Respondent
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